Simone Weil and nationalism (3)

A Christian patriotism?

The Nazi menace served to concentrate the minds of Weil and others, not only on the dangers of European nationalism, but on the need to preserve a patriotism strong enough to resist foreign aggression. France rapidly disintegrated when invaded by Germany, despite having a military force that was on paper strong enough to defend herself successfully. It is widely acknowledged that this failure reflected a deep malaise in French society that developed in the years before the war, a malaise that left the French divided and uncertain whether they had anything worth risking their lives to defend.

Weil attempts to describe a form of patriotism that does not violate her conception of Christian morality. First, it would recognize that the nation had no value in itself, but solely as a vital medium benefitting its inhabitants. Human beings have basic needs (some of which Weil describes in unfamiliar ways) which can be met only with the help of the state. We should support the state only as a means of fulfilling our unconditional obligations to look to the needs of our fellow human beings.

These obligations are to all human beings, not just to our fellow nationals; thus, any action by the state that unjustly hurts foreigners is to be opposed. In this respect, Weil would seem to agree with our contemporary liberals who regard the state as a kind of local representative of the interests of mankind in general, with no special duty to its own citizens; at any rate, this conclusion is certainly derivable from Weil's argument. Weil seems to deny the natural feeling that we owe more to fellow-citizens than to the inhabitants of unfamiliar lands on the other side of the globe. The concept of universal moral obligation is, I think, a view with a respectable Christian pedigree. Only now, however, do some people in positions of power seem to be using it to justify their policies.

Regarding one's country as a "vital medium", Weil persuasively points out, would avoid the "contradictions and lies which corrode the idea of patriotism." One would no longer regard the country as uniquely valuable, but would acknowledge the legitimate interests of other such vital media. One would also recognize that one's country had been produced by causes in which both good and evil were mixed up. Since one's country would no longer be considered an absolute good in itself, it would be unnecessary to pretend that its history was unblemished. It might even be of lesser value than those societies formerly existing in its territory, which had been destroyed in the nation's drive to power; nevertheless, since those societies cannot be reconstructed, the existing nation is the only available "vital medium", and it must still be considered precious. This temperate form of patriotism would, however, encourage political decentralization as a means of partially healing the wounds formerly inflicted on distinct local cultures. It would also support limited internationalization of political power. The cult of the nation-state, by contrast, is opposed to both of these forms of diminution of national power.

Weil's other major proposal is that Roman-style patriotism, the pagan worship of national power, should be replaced by a Christian compassion for one's country. She regards Joan of Arc, who said that she felt pity for the troubled kingdom of France, as the great model for this alternative patriotic ethic; also, Jesus demonstrated it when he wept over the fate of Jerusalem. As St. Joan showed, such compassion does not preclude warlike energy. As a man is capable of heroism in the protection of his children or aged parents, so should the citizen be capable of heroism in the defense of his imperilled country.

The key here is that Weil's Christian love is a love for fragility, and perhaps beauty. One can love what is fragile, but one will not idolize it; love for the strong is inherently idolatrous. We are permitted to love fragility and beauty in the world, but worship of strength must be reserved for the supramundane. One has the choice of loving France for her apparent permanence or as something which may be destroyed; patriotism must be restricted to the latter form. (One might note here that this also "solves" the problem of nationalism in small nations. It is ridiculous to idolize one's country when it is small and insignificant in the world—though this has not stopped people making the effort—but it is relatively easy to regard such a country as vulnerable.)

Weil believes that this new form of patriotism must be inculcated by reforming the system of public education. If children continue to be taught to admire greatness of the Roman type, if we continue to honor (in Weil's view) essentially evil men, not only do we give those men exactly the kind of victory they sought, we also invite our most energetic children to emulate them.

As far as I can see, Weil does not succeed in putting together a reformed educational program, though she makes some interesting suggestions in this connection. One problem she discusses is the need to recount genuinely good acts in our national history for us to emulate: without the study of history, there can be no patriotism. The difficulty is that few such actions are good enough to meet Weil's moral requirements; moreover, most such events will go unrecorded. In French history, for example, she can come up only with the examples of Joan of Arc and of those little-known Catholics of Béziers who sheltered heretics at the cost of their own lives. Besides eking out what little true goodness there is in the historical record, students will therefore have to be taught to love that which has disappeared from the record, Weil proposes. Such a suggestion seems to lend itself to ridicule. In lesser hands than Weil's, such a concept is also likely to produce "people's histories" which serve us up with pseudo-heroes who are not morally outstanding, but merely mediocre in their accomplishments.