Comments on the BNP constitution

BNP leader Nick Griffin (see this earlier post) gave a speech in which he appeared to announce that a BNP government would take direct control of the British TV and newspapers. By contrast, the provision of the party constitution (2004 edition; pdf file here) dealing with free speech and other civil liberties seems to be the most liberal part of that document. . . . CONTINUE Section 1, Article 2f says:

The British National Party will introduce a Bill of Rights, establishing as absolute the right of all British people to effective freedom of speech, assembly and worship. The undemocratic power of the mass media and vested interest groups will be curbed by the introduction of a statutory right of reply and tougher penalties for corruption in public affairs. We favour a devolved, democratic system in which political decisions are made by ordinary citizens at the most local level of government possible. We are pledged to extend and rejuvenate democratic government by means of electronic media and Citizens' Initiative referenda, and by returning to Parliament the powers that have been appropriated by the EU.

Thus, according to this statement, the mass media would suffer nothing more than being forced to give airtime or space to those it criticized, or so I interpret a "statutory right of reply". It is not clear how one should interpret what appears to be such a flagrant contradiction. If Art. 2f were merely for public relations purposes, why would the BNP publicize a speech contradicting it? The article is also part of a constitution which seems to be a serious document, not a propaganda device—at least where it deals with internal party affairs. Perhaps, as is often the case with opposition political parties, there is no coherent policy position in this area.

Ordinarily, the effect of such incoherence is to leave the status quo intact in the event that the party comes to power. Would this be the case with a BNP government? It seems difficult for an outsider to say. Presumably, though, any government trying to direct a mass media previously dominated by liberals would require a fairly large number of personnel dedicated to this task. The kind of contradiction just noted would seem to work against establishing such a group within the BNP, unless it was generally understood at upper party levels that Article 2f was only "for show"—that is, unless there was a second, secret constitution alongside the public one (which seems implausible). For comparison, one might look to the German Nazi Party, which, I think, never made any bones about its intention to abolish such "decadent" liberal institutions as freedom of the press.

The internal party aspects of the constitution, meanwhile, strike me as a curious mixture of Anglo-Saxon political tradition and the Führerprinzip. A great deal of power is given to the party leader (the Chairman), including even the power to make constitutional changes (Sect. 14). One might think that this would render the constitution meaningless, and the power of the Chairman absolute. Yet many of the provisions of the constitution describe working legal forms. Most importantly, there is an annual election, by the party membership, to the Chairmanship, in the event that anyone challenges the incumbent (Sect. 4); the procedures for holding the election are laid out in some detail, and Nick Griffin himself won his position in a contested election. There is also an "advisory council" which may call a general membership meeting, over the opposition of the Chairman, by a two-thirds majority, and this general meeting can then make changes to the constitution (Sect. 14). Thus the advisory council would seem to provide a potential check to the power of the Chairman—if not a very strong one, given that the Chairman himself appoints the advisory council. In Section 3, the Chairman is given "full executive power" over all party appointments and policies, yet has to remain within broad policy guidelines spelled out in Section 1 (at least, presumably, until he announces that those guidelines are to be amended). Such provisions as the vetting of all parliamentary candidates by the Chairman (Sect. 11) are not in the traditional parliamentary spirit, but then neither are they unusual among contemporary centrist parties.

Who can say how such a constitution might evolve as the organization approached power?

Update (08/10): Some recent discussion of the BNP at the American blog View From the Right:

• Explaining the BNP
• How reformed is the BNP?
• BNP writer comes out 100 percent for Israel

And a 2005 article by Robert Locke: BNP goes straight

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